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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintHf and Respon.dent,

-vs.-

Case No. 9619

EDGAR GLEN GUDE,
Defen,dant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATE11ENT OF T'HE KIND OF CASE
Thris is a criminal case w·herein the defendant was
charged and convicted of the crime of grand larceny
for having taken his 1953 Ford Autornobile from the
possession of Harold's Auto Sales, an auto repair business in Ogden, lTtah (R. 7).
The· case was tried to a JUry, which returned a
verdict of guilty on N ovmnber 9, 1961, and on November
13, 1961, the trial court sentenced the defendant to the
L t.a:h State Prison for a term of not less than one nor
more than ten years (R. 27).
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and sentence.

ST·ATE11ENT OF FACTS
On August 16, 1961, the defendant and his friend,
Garth Walton, towed defendant's Ford automobile to
Harold's Auto Sales iin order to obtain an estimate of
the oost of needed repairs. The estimate given for overhauling the oar by L. Eugene Seifert, a mechanic employed by Harold's, was in the neighborhood of $180.00
(T;r. 96). The defendant left his car at the garage and
returned to Montana where he was employed. He did
not return to H·arold's until noon on Septe·mber 20, 1961,
to inquire whether the repairs on his car had been completed. At that tune he was presented with the repair
bill (plaintiff's Exhibit "A"), which totaled $345.97.
The·re is a dispute in the testimony with respect to
defendant's reaction when confronted with this bill, but
in any event, he asked Mr. Pettigrew, an en1ployee at
Harold's, to leave the car by the garage while he went
to Salt Lake to get some money owed him by another
to pay for the car (Tr. 13). Not being able to get the
money in Salt L·ake, defendant returned to Ogden and
went to the Friendly Tavern where he met his friend,
Denny Ma..-x:well, and proceeded to tell him of his predicament. Maxwell indic,ated an interest in buying the car,
and defendant returned to Harold's to see if he could
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get permission to bring the car into town to demonstrate
and possibly sell it to obtain nwney with whieh to pay
the bill. Defendant arrived at Harold's .at approxnnately
10:00 p.In., one hour after 1-Iarold's had dosed for the
night. Finding no one there and assmning he had a
right to take his own car, defendant drove it from the
lot (T1·. 68, G9 and 77). J\1r. Pettigrew called the police
the next morning to report the missing car.
On Septe~nber 23, 1961, at approxunately 8 :00 a.m.,
officer Judkins of the Ogden City Police D;epartment,
received a call to go to \V ashington Boulevard and
Goddard Street to investigate a man who had been
stopped while driving the 1953 Ford in question. The
driver of the car was Dennis Maxwell (Tr. 3.3-34). As
officer Judkins testified, Maxwell claimed to be the
owner of the car and presented a certificate of registration and a Montana title to the automobile; however,
the registration and Montana title were not endorsed
by the defendant nor signed by the alleged owner (Tr~
39, 40, 81). The off[cer took Maxwell down to the Police
Station .and in the presence of the defendant, who later
arrived, interrogated Maxwell concerning ownership of
the car. The State attempted to show through Officer
Judkins and Officer Wold that defendant had in fact
sold the car to M.:.axwell for $50.00 and that Maxwell
told them this in defendant's presence. Defendant being
confused and feeling that his friend was in trouble did
not deny this claim (Tr. 36, 37, 43, 44 and 72). J\tlaxweU
could not be found at time of trial (T'r. 40).
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D·efendant testified that on the Saturday of September 23rd, in the hall at the Police Station, he had a
conversation with the complainant's partner (Eugene
Seifert) and that (Seifert) .agreed that son1e arrangement could be worked out for defendant to pay the bill.
This conversation took place after the Sergeant said the
affair was a civil matter and defendant and (Seifert)
would have to straighten it out (Tr. 72, 73). Defendant
showed the car to another prospective buyer on the 27th
of September at the pound (the car was impounded the
23rd of September due to its Montana license which
was out of date), but the buyer felt that the offering
price of $345.00 was too much for the car. When this
deal fell through complainant's partner (Seifert) who
was at the pound at the time told defendant "Well, you
had better get that money today. If you don't, I'm going
to sign out a complaint against you." (Tr. 74)
At the trial defendant's counsel, Mr. Raat, called
defendant to the stand to explain his side of the story
and asked defendant if he had ever been convicted of
a felony to which the defendant answered "Yes." Defendant testified that the last time he was convicted
of a felony was in 1952 ( Tr. 61). On cross-exanrination
Mr. Newey, attorney for the State, asked defendant how
many times he had been convicted of a felony to which
defense counsel objected for the reason that it was incompetent, irrelevant and ilnmaterial to the case~ The
court allowed the answer and defendant testified that
he had been convicted of a felony three times. The
State inquired as to the nature of each felony over
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dl•l'l'lHlnnt'~ obj<•etion and defendant testified that he had

been <·onvided of 8tatutory rape and twice for .anned
roblwr:· (T1·. 75-76).
~ \ ftl•r thP c:onclusion of the evidence the court In:-;tnwte<l the jury a:s follow8:

"Before you can find the Defendant guilty of
the offense of grand larceny, as charged in the
infonnation, the State 1nust prove to your satisfaction, beyond a reasonable doubt, the following:
1. r:ehat on or about August 16, 1961, in Weber
Cotmty, L'tah, the Defendant left with Ha~old's
_:\uto Sales for repairs his 1953 automobile.
2. That on or about the 20th day of September, 1961, the Defendant rmnoved said .automobile
fr·oni the possession of 1Iarold 's Auto Sales without the pennission of said Harold's Auto Sales.
That the taking away of said autmnobile was done
·with the "'ilful, unlawful and felonious intent of
depriving the said Harold's Auto Sales of its right
as a lien-holder to the possession of said automobile.

If you are satisfied frmn all of the evidence
in this ease, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the
above enu1nerated fac~ts, then you should return
a verdict of guilty of g1~and larceny as charged
against the Defendant. But if there is a reasonable doubt in your nrinds as to the foregoing facts,
then you n1ay not convict the Defendant of the
cri1ne of grand larceny and your verdict must be
not guilty.
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'Felonious' Ineans proceeding from an evil
heart or purpose, done with a deliberate purpose
to commit a cDime. A n1alicious wrongful act."
(Tr. 112).
Defendant objected to this instruction and requested
the following one which was denied for the reason that
it had already been covered in another instruction.
''In theft by larceny, the fe}onious intent that
I have ment1oned must exist when possession of
the property is originally obtained by the person
not entitled thereto, and it is not larceny to
take property of another through mistake or
under an honestly entertained claim of ownership or right to possession." (R. 19).
This appeal is d~rected at the errors committed by
the trial court in allowing the State to make further
inquiry into defendant's previous criminal convictions,
giving an instruction to the jury which asswned that
certain facts had been established thus taking away from
the jury its function as the sole judge of the facts of
the_ case, and for failing to allow defendant's instruction
which related to defendant's theory of the case and
defendant's laak of criminal intent.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING
STATE'S COUNSEL TO MAKE FURTHER INQUIRY OF
THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF DEFENDANT'S PREVIOUS FELONY CONVICTIONS.
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rrhe case of State v. Parker (1943), 104 Utah 23,
137 P. :2d 626, established that a person could be guilty
of larceny by taking his own property from a bailee,
however, that ease "\vas noted as one which constituted
an abuse of the crim:inal n1achinery. Considering this
case within that light, the conduct of the trial court in
allowing the State's counsel to pursue his inquiry with
respect to defendant's previous criminal convictions prior
to the year 1952, defendant's last criminal conviction,
was an abuse of discretion and prejudiced the jury and
diverted its attention from the main issue of the cas~.
The case of State v. Hougensen (1936), 91 Utah
351, 64 P. 2d 229 at page 238, sets forth principles with
respect to impeachment of a witness's testimony. Although one of the principles set :Borth states that a
witness may be asked on cross-examination whether he
had been convicted of a felony, this is not an absolute
right and comes within the trial court's discretion after
it considers the effect of the questions in their tendency
to prejudice the jury against the defendant or divert
its attention from the main issue of the case and the
purpose sought to be accomplished by the impeachment.
The H ougen~sen case, supra, sets forth this principle
as follows:
''While a defendant in a criminal case who
takes the stand may be cross-examined by counsel
for the state, as any other witness (section 105-±5-5, R.S. 1933), the matter of judicial discretion
affecting all witnesses under the varying circumstances under which each may testify is not af-
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fected by such statute, and as elements in the
exercise of such discretion, the court should consider the effect of questions in their tendency
to prejudice the jury against the defendant or
divert its attention from the main issue or issues
of the case as weighed against the effect of such
quest~ons in affecting the credibility of the witness, keeping in mind that such questions as to
a defendant 1nay directly prejudice the jury in
the case, whereas in c.ase of a witness not a
defendant they do no more than prejudice the
jury against such witness and thus less directly
affect the case. State v. Williams, 36 Utah, 273,
103 P. 250; State v. Vance, supra; State v. Shockley, supra. But we think the matter should be
left to the sound discretion of the court and do
not intend to lay down any rule that under no
circumstances can the defendant like any other
witness be questioned as to his ·acts, criminal or
otherwise, in accord with rule 7, which may tend
to affect his credibility as a witness, subject
always to the exercise of his personal privilege
in proper cases."
In the present case the defendant had already admitted that he had been convicted of a felony; whatever
effect such admission had on defendant's credibility as
a witness had already been served. Inquiry into criminal
convictions prior to 1952 for purpose of further impeachment was so far removed in tilne and in light of the
admis,sion already made was totally irrelevant and immaterial. The only effect and puTpose of such inquiry
was to prejudice the jury against the defendant and
to divert its attention from the main issue of the case.
Such anquiry should not have been allowed and it constituted a serious abuse of discretion by the trial court.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTION TO
THE JURY CONCERNING THE ELEMENTS OF GRAND
LARCENY REQUIRED TO BE PROVED BY THE STATE.

The instruction to which exception is taken is set
forth at page 112 of the transcript and the Statement
of F.acts of this brief. The particular portions of said
instruction which constitute error are as follows:

''* * * That the taking away of s.aid autontobile was done with the wilful, unlawful and
felonious intent of depriving the said Harold's
Auto Sales of its right as a lien-holder to the
possession of said automobile.* * * ."
The court erred by le-aving out of its instruction the
word "permanently'' pre-ceding the word "depriving."
Trial counsel objected to this omission (Tr. 119) and
properly so, because it related to defendant's intent
and because the omission of the- word "permanently"
withheld from the jury the defendant's theory of the
ease that defendant was only taking the- car for the
limited purpose of finding a buyer so that with the
proce-eds he would be able- to pay his debt at Harold's
Auto Sales. A felonious intent is inconsistent with a
bona fide intent of returning the- property. 32 Am. Jur.
Section 37, page 928, Wharton'$ Cri1n~nal Law, 12th Ed.,
Vol. 2, Section 1122, p.age 1431.
The instruction was further rn error be-cause the
trial court assumed in the instruction that the facts
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which the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
had already been established. The Court did this in the
following way:
"• • * If you are satisfied fron1 all of the
evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt,
of the above enumerated facts, then you should
return a verdict of guilty of grand larceny a.s
charged .against the D'efendant. But if there is
a reasonable doubt in your minds as to the foregoing facts, then you may not convict the Defendant of the crime of grand larceny and your
verdict must be not guilty.***" (Tr. 112)

The instruction as given was misleading to the
jury. It assumed that the facts had already been established, thus taking away from the jury its function ws
sole judge of the facts of the case.
32 Am. Jur. Section 153 at page 1069 sets forth
the following principle.

"Instructions.-• • •. An instruction should
not be given which invades the province of the
jury to detennine the inferences to be drawn
from the evidence. Thus, it is reversible error for
the oourt to .assmne in the instructions that the
corpus delicti, or any fact necessary to establish
the guilt of the accused, has been proved, and
so relieve the jury from its consideration, unless
the same is expressly or tacitly admitted by the
defendant."
In the case of Zediker v. State (1921, Neb.) 184 N. W.
80, the court held that it was error for the trial court
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where the oorpus delicti was in dispute, to assume in
its instnwtion that the corpus delicti was established
or to refer to it as an established fact even though in
another instruction the court instructed the jury that
they were the sole judges of the facts.
In St.ate v. Green. (1931), 78 Utah 580, 6 P. 2d 177
at p.age 181 the court held:

" * * * the trial judge is not permitted to comrnent on the evidence, much less may he indicate
to the jury that some rnaterial facts, not admitted
at the trial, are established beyond controversy. It
is the sole and exclusive province of the jury to
deterrnine the facts in all criminal cases * * *.
The provision of our State Constitution which
grants .accused persons the ~ight to a trial by
jury extends to each and all of the facts * * • and
such right may not be invaded by the presiding
judge indicating to the jury that any of such
facts are established by the evidence."
It is submitted for the foregoing reasons that the
instruction as given was misleading and erroneous.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION.

53 Am. Jttr. Section 581, page 458 sets forth the
following prin0iple of law:

"Ignoring Issues, Theories, or Defenses.While the instructions should not go beyond matters put in issue by the pleadings and supported
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by the proof, they should cover all the material
issues thus raised in a case. A court instructing
the jury may not ignore or withdraw from the
jury issues of f.act which are in the case and
supported by evidence, a ground of liability, or
a proper defense. Nor should it give instructions
whi~h tend to or do eliminate an issue properly
before the jury and supported by evidence, or
exclude from their consideration points which
are fairly raised by the evidence on either side."
B~nd

v. United States (1901), 180 U. S. 356, 45 L.
Ed. 570, dealt with an erroneous instruction which omitted
the defendant's theory of the case of self-defense. The
pertinent portion of the instruction which was given is
as follows:
''The court instructs the jury, if they believe
frmn the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
* * * that s.aid :killing was not in the necessary
defense of the defendant's life or to prevent
the infliction upon him o.f great bodily harm,
then it is your duty to find the defendant guilty

,.

.. "

The defendant objected to this instruction because
it was not qualified by the further charge that

" '* * * If the defendant believed, and had
re:ason to believe, that the killing was necessary
for the defense of his life or to prevent the infliction upon him of gre·at bodily harm, then he was
not guilty'. "
The court stated in finding this to be an erroneous
instruction :
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''The question involved * • ·* was .a fundamental one in the case; indeed, it may he said
that the defendant's sole defense rested upon it.
The defendant, as shown in the bill of exceptions,
had testified to his own belief that his life was in
danger, and to the facts that led him so to believe;
but by the instruction given the jury were left
to pass upon the vital question without reference
to the defendant's evidence."
In the instant case defendant testified that he had
taken the car for the limited purpose of demonstrating
it for sale so that he could pay his deht to Harold's
Auto Sales; that he did not have any intention to permanently deprive Harold's of the value of its lien claim,
and that defendant thought he had a right to taJke his
automobile frmn the lot (T'r. 6·9, 81).
Defendant's refused instruction was the only instruction which pertained to defendant's theory of the case
with respect to taking property tmder an honestly entertained claim of ownership or right to its possession. The
failure of the trial court to grant this instruction deprived the jury of an important statement of the law
which was consistent with defendant's theory of the
ease. Such a failure was highly prejudicial to defendant
and constituted error by the trial court.

CONCLUSION
Like the Parker case, supra, this case represents an
abuse of the criminal process. It is apparent from the
facts that the officers of the Police Department did not
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believe that a crin1e had been cornn1itted or they would
have arrested defendant on Saturday, the 23rd day of
September, when defendant was .at the police station
with his friend !faxwell. It was not until the 27th day
of September, after defendant had failed to raise the
money, that he w.as arrested pursuant to the criminal
complaint signed by Mr. Pettigrew of Haro1d's Auto
Sales (R. 1). Failure to pay a debt resulted in defendant's prosecution and conviction. He was also convicted
because of past felony convictions, because the trial
court took away from the jury its determination of all
the facts in the case, and because the trial court refused
to allow defendant's instruction concerning defendant's
good faith intent with respect to his own property. In
the interest of justice the conviction should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

FRANK J. GUSTIN
1007 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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